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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of globalization if any on inflation and the 
inflation process. We estimate standard Phillips curve equations on a panel of OECD 
countries over the last 25 years. While recent papers have concluded that globalization has 
had no significant impact, this paper highlights that trying to capture globalization effects 
through simple measures of import prices and/or imports to GDP ratios can be misleading. 
To do so, we try to extend the analysis following two different avenues. We first separate 
between commodity and non-commodity imports and show that the impact on inflation of 
commodity import price inflation is qualitatively different from the impact of non- 
commodity import price inflation, the former depending on the volume of commodity 
imports while the latter being independent of the volume of non-commodity imports. This 
first piece of evidence highlights the role of contestability and the insufficiency of trade 
volume statistics to properly describe the impact of globalization. This leads us to adopt a 
more systematic approach to capture the contents and not only the volume of trade. 
Focusing on the role of intra-industry trade, we provide preliminary evidence that this 
variable can account (i) for the low pass-through of import price to consumer price and (ii) 
for the flattening of the Phillips curve, i.e. the lower sensitivity of inflation to changes in 
output gap. We hence conclude that different facets of globalization, especially changes in 
the nature of goods traded, can be an important channel through which globalization affects 
the inflation process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last two decades, a significant fall in inflation has been observed, first in developed 
countries, and then in emerging economies. Over the same period, there has been a large 
increase in international trade not only for goods and services but also for financial assets, 
labour, technology and capital. This phenomenon labelled as globalization did start before the 
eighties, but it has strongly accelerated during the last two decades following both the fall in 
international transaction costs (trade and information costs) and the integration of a large 
number of developing economies to world trade which feature very low labour costs 
compared to mature economies. 
 
The simultaneity between the modern wave of globalization and the worldwide fall in 
inflation has suggested that one could be a consequence of the other, the rise in international 
trade helping bring inflation down. Indeed as notes former chairman A. Greenspan “Over the 
past two decades, inflation has fallen notably, virtually worldwide, as has economic volatility. 
Although a complete understanding of the reasons remains elusive, globalization and 
innovation would appear essential elements of any paradigm capable of explaining the events 
of the past ten years. ”  
 
We are hence left with two questions: First, does globalization and more precisely, the rise in 
international trade in goods in services, bear any responsibility in the dramatic slowdown in 
trend inflation? Second, do the changes in the short term behaviour of inflation owe anything 
to the rise in international trade in goods in services?  While a definitive answer to each of 
these two questions is largely beyond the scope of this paper, we focus in this paper on two 
aspects of the last question - the short term effects of globalization on the inflation level on 
the one hand and on the inflation cyclical behaviour on the other hand. On each of these two 
aspects, we provide empirical evidence which suggest that the view that globalization has not 
had any significant impact on inflation deserves some closer scrutiny. 
 
 There is one fundamental theoretical reason why inflation may not have much to do with 
globalization. It is that inflation reflects changes in the general price level while globalization 
mainly affects relative prices, i.e. the idiosyncratic component to each good price. For 
instance if trade openness reduces the price of a given good, it does so relatively to the price   3
of other goods and services which is precisely what inflation is not about. This argument has 
been made forcefully by L. Ball (2006). On the basis of the dichotomy between relative prices 
and the general price level, L. Ball argues that globalization cannot affect trend inflation 
which is anything but a monetary phenomenon under the control of the money issuer, i.e. the 
central bank.  
 
However, there are a number of important limits to this argument. First, it does obviously not 
rule out the possibility that globalization affects the cyclical variations in inflation, or more 
generally the cyclical properties of the inflation process. At least, the mechanism through 
which that may happen is not straightforward3. Second, this argument directly relies on the 
dichotomy between changes in relative prices and changes in the general price level. While 
this dichotomy is totally relevant in the long run, it does not apply in the short run. Hence 
globalization can affect in the short run the inflation level. Finally it is possible that this 
dichotomy does not apply in the long run either. Considering a menu cost model for instance, 
if globalization raises the frequency and/or the magnitude of (relative) price updates, this will 
induce the central bank to adopt a lower inflation rate4, inflation being essentially a second 
best mechanism which helps dampen the real effects of nominal rigidity. Alternatively if the 
central bank suffers a credibility problem, then globalization can have an impact on inflation 
through its mitigating effect on the central bank lack of credibility. 
 
Using a simple time inconsistency model this last argument has been developed by K. Rogoff 
(2004). When the central bank faces the possibility to raise output through inflation at the cost 
of moving from the rule based to the discretionary equilibrium, the central bank incentives to 
raise inflation are lower when the difference between actual and optimal output is lower. If 
the globalization induced reduction in the rents firms can actually seek tends to reduce the 
difference between first and second best output levels, then the central bank will less 
frequently resort to the discretionary equilibrium of high inflation. As a consequence trend 
inflation will be lower. In some sense, globalization reinforces monetary policy credibility 
and acts as a commitment device when the central bank announces a low inflation objective. 
Globalization could hence have shifted the global economy into a low inflation environment. 
                                                    
3  If globalization modifies price rigidity - for instance the frequency of price changes-, then this can likely modify the 
relationship between inflation and the output gap.  
4  The dichotomy between nominal and real price changes does essentially apply in neo-keynesian frameworks with sticky 
prices “à la Calvo”, i.e. where firms update their prices following a Poisson process with exogenous parameters. It fails to 
apply  as soon as price stickiness is endogenous to monetary policy.   4
While this story is appealing and seems relevant especially to account for the fall of inflation 
in countries where central banks used to suffer from a credibility problem (in particular 
emerging market economies with high inflation records), it does behave quite poorly in the 
face of developments in mature economies especially as regards its implications for the slope 
of the Phillips curve. In theory, lower rents and lower mark-ups should tend to reduce the 
gains to raise inflation and hence raise the slope of the Phillips curve –a larger change in 
inflation is needed to increase output in a given amount-. But there is overwhelming evidence 
that the slope of the Phillips curve has if anything decreased not increased - a larger increase 
in output can in principle now follow a given increase in inflation-. This counter-factual 
prediction has put into question the role of globalization in the reduction in trend inflation in 
developed economies.  
 
Borio and Filardo (2007) have recently tackled the question claiming that Phillips curve 
flattening itself can be regarded as a consequence of globalization. Not withstanding the fact 
that stronger competition should in theory tend to steepen the inflation output trade-off, they 
stress that globalization could well reduce the sensitivity of inflation to domestic output 
essentially because net imports can act as a buffer to balance domestic demand and supply, 
this helping curb inflationary pressures. They successfully test this idea. More precisely they 
show that a measure of foreign output gap -a weighted average of trade partner output gaps 
has a significant explanatory power in the cyclical variations of inflation. Moreover they show 
that the sensitivity of inflation to the measure of foreign output gap has increased over time 
while the sensitivity to domestic output gap has on the contrary been reduced. Yet, a debate 
has grown around the empirical relevance of measures of foreign output gap for domestic 
inflation. Ihrig et al. (2006) has recently shown that the effect of foreign output gap on 
domestic inflation is not always robust to alternative empirical specifications especially when 
inflation persistence is accounted for. 
 
Hence, the empirical debate on globalization – inflation nexus is still largely unsettled, and 
the validity of the view that globalization has significantly affected inflation largely depends 
upon which factor of globalization and which facet of inflation is being considered. As far as 
theory is concerned, things are pretty different.  
 
Using the utility based approach to monetary policy, Razin and Loungani (2005) show that 
central banks tend to focus on maintaining low inflation more heavily, the more open the   5
economy is. The idea is that trade and financial openness tend to reduce the inefficiency of 
fluctuations in the output gap relative to the inefficiency of fluctuations in the inflation rate. 
Addressing a different question, Woodford (2007) shows that the fear that globalization could 
harm the ability of central banks to control domestic inflation is largely overdone as long as 
the central bank chooses the right interest rate rule and in particular to react to changes in the 
output gap of foreign trading partners.  
 
Almost all theoretical approaches to the globalization-inflation debate however suffer the 
discrepancy between the (recent) trade literature which focuses on the microeconomic 
adjustment to trade (within firms or labour markets with a particular emphasis on firm 
heterogeneity) and the new Keynesian framework, the now standard approach to monetary 
policy where microeconomic mechanisms are quite primitive (a good example being the 
relationship between trade and market power). It is now a stylized fact that openness to trade 
is pro-competitive and tends to reduce firm mark-ups (cf. Boulhol (2005)). However the 
standard approach to monetary policy based on CES utility functions implies no particular 
relationship between openness to trade and mark-ups. In fact there are largely orthogonal to 
each other. This discrepancy between some basic stylized facts and the models’ predictions 
undoubtedly calls for precaution in asserting that globalization has or has not affected 
inflation on the basis of these models. 
 
Our paper aims at contributing to the debate over the globalization inflation nexus. Lacking a 
proper theoretical framework to assess the relevant mechanism and determine the magnitude 
of these effects, we favour an empirical approach with the aim to determine stylized facts on 
the question of the impact of globalization on inflation. The results the paper brings are 
broadly divided into two main parts. Based on a standard Phillips curve equation –following a 
number of previous studies of the empirical literature-, we first assess the effect of 
globalization on inflation through the traditional channel of import prices. We provide three 
simple results. 
 
First, the effect of import price inflation on consumer price index (CPI) inflation is low, 
around 10-15%. This means that a 1pp increase in import price inflation produces an 
instantaneous 0.1-0.15pp increase in CPI inflation. These figures are roughly in line with the 
magnitudes found in the literature. Hence if globalization affects CPI inflation exclusively 
through import price inflation, given CPI inflation estimated persistence, a 1pp permanent   6
decrease in CPI inflation requires a 3-5pp permanent decrease in import price inflation. 
Clearly no country in our sample has experienced such a large shock while the permanent 
decrease in inflation has been largely above 1pp. Is this evidence that globalization has had 
very tiny effects on inflation? Yes as long as, as stated above, globalization impacts inflation 
exclusively through import price inflation. No if other channels need to be considered. 
Among other channels that need to be considered lies the volume of imports:  it is likely that 
the effect of import price inflation depend on the import penetration. To put it briefly, it is 
reasonable to believe that CPI inflation in an almost closed economy is less sensitive to 
import price inflation than in a fully open economy. 
 
The second result we come up with is the paradox that the sensitivity of CPI inflation to 
import price inflation does not significantly depend on the volume of imports (as a share of 
GDP). Hence we are left with the puzzle that import price inflation affects CPI inflation 
similarly whatever the volume of imports to GDP. This leads us to investigate the source of 
this unexpected result. To do so we decompose imports between commodity and non 
commodity imports and we test for each of these two items whether they affect CPI inflation 
independently from or conditionally on the volume of the relevant imports.  
 
This investigation brings our third result:  the impact of import price inflation does depend on 
the volume of imports but only for commodity imports. For non commodity imports, the 
impact of import price inflation on CPI inflation is the same whatever the volume of non 
commodity imports. An interpretation to this result is that the presence or the lack of 
contestability is fundamental to assess the impact of globalization on inflation. Non-
commodity imports are essentially manufactured goods imports for which contestability exists. 
Hence domestic producers modify their prices according to the price of imports or according 
to the international price whatever the effective volume of imports because the threat of 
possible imports triggered by arbitrage opportunities stemming from price gaps is credible. 
Hence globalization effects on inflation could materialize even in the absence of any trade 
flow. However, this is not true for commodity goods. These goods have no direct substitute 
(think of energy or agricultural goods for example). Hence the effect of commodity import 
price inflation on CPI inflation is proportional to the volume of commodity imports. 
 
The second part of the paper is devoted to systematize the intuition that the key element to 
assess the impact of globalization on inflation is the extent to which goods imported can be   7
similar or used as substitutes to goods produced domestically. To capture similarity between 
goods imported and goods produced domestically in a given market we consider the Grubel-
Lloyd index of intra-industry trade5. This index basically compares the volume of net trade 
(absolute difference between imports and exports) to the volume of total trade (sum of 
imports and exports) within a given sector. The larger the volume of net trade, the lower the 
similarity between imports and domestic output and hence the weaker the threat that imports 
can easily replace domestic output. Intuitively with large net exports, imports do not 
constitute a significant threat to domestic producers. Conversely, large net imports arise when 
domestic output is unable to meet domestic demand for some goods. There is then no 
substitutability between domestic output and imports. However it is important to note that the 
Grubel-Lloyd index refers to exports rather than domestic output. While it is possible to 
assume that exports are a relevant approximation of domestic output, we also consider as an 
alternative indicator the import penetration ratio which compares the volume of imports to 
total demand at the industry level6. We use these indexes to show two different properties.  
 
First we go on with the examination of import price inflation pass-through to CPI inflation 
and check whether intra-industry trade index could be a significant determinant of it. More 
precisely we run a horse race with different variables, including the volume of imports, the 
degree of labour market rigidity or the degree of monetary policy credibility. We show that 
the index for intra-industry trade is a significant determinant of import price inflation pass-
through to CPI inflation. This confirms the view that the impact of globalization on inflation 
does not depend on the actual volume of trade but on the potential volume of trade more 
accurately captured by the Grubel-Lloyd index or the import penetration ratio. Moreover 
higher intra-industry trade is always found to reduce the pass-through of import price inflation 
to CPI inflation. This is entirely consistent with the view that higher substitutability between 
domestic output and imports tends to reduce the impact of import price inflation. For example 
a positive shock on import price inflation is less inflationary as domestic demand can more 
easily substitute imports with domestic output. Openness of mature economies to low cost 
countries is also a good illustration of the impact of intra-industry trade on import price 
inflation pass-through. The former tends to reduce the index of intra-industry trade because it 
triggers specialization across countries. So CPI inflation in mature economies is more 
sensitive to import price inflation because more goods –especially labour intensive goods 
                                                    
5 Grubel and Lloyd (1975, p. 86) define intra-industry trade as “trade in differentiated products which are close substitutes”.   8
such as textiles, shoes or toys- are consumed but not produced anymore domestically. Hence 
an interesting paradox arises: if globalization tends to raise the extent of intra-industry trade, 
then the low pass-through of import price inflation to CPI inflation which could be considered 
at first glance as illustrating that globalization has (had) no impact on inflation is indeed due 
to a particular feature of globalization, i.e. the relative importance (increase) of intra-industry 
trade in total trade of mature economies. 
 
Second we study whether the intra-industry trade index can be a determinant of the slope of 
the Phillips curve. The intuition is the following: if the goods domestically produced are 
similar to the goods imported then domestic inflation should be less sensitive to changes in 
the domestic output gap. On the contrary, there is no particular reason why the volume of 
imports should affect the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap since imports can typically 
be goods for which there is no particular domestic substitute (think of energy for instance). 
We confirm both of these intuitive predictions and show that the volume of trade has no 
significant explanatory power on the slope of the Phillips curve while the intra-industry trade 
index does account for the reduction in the sensitivity of domestic CPI inflation to the 
domestic output gap7. This result systematizes the intuition of Borio and Filardo (2007): 
imports can act as a buffer in the domestic supply and demand equilibrium, hence reducing 
the sensitivity of domestic inflation to domestic output. However for this property to hold, we 
need that imports can easily substitute domestic output. This is what we capture through the 
intra-industry trade measure. Besides avoiding the caveats of foreign output gap data building, 
intra-industry trade hence provides a simple measure of how globalization has contributed to 
Phillips curve flattening. Finally, we show that our results are robust to the inclusion of a 
number of variables such as monetary policy credibility, labour market rigidity, financial 
integration, etc… and also to different measures of intra-industry trade. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                   
6 Tables show that the results are qualitatively the same whatever the indicator used be it Grubel-Lloyd or import penetration. 
7 Following our interpretation, openness to low cost countries should trigger a steeper Phillips curve while on the basis of a 
simple intuition, the induced specialization creates or increases the wedge between the goods produced domestically and the 
goods consumed. Hence this would rather reduce the sensitivity of CPI inflation to the domestic output. Flatter Phillips curve 
would then be associated with lower not higher intra-industry trade as we claim here. This simple intuition however misses 
two important effects. Consider the example of a mature economy where the domestic textile industry disappears. Then the 
pricing power of the average producer in the mature economy increases because the most constrained producers in terms of 
pricing power –those of the domestic textile industry- have disappeared due to low cost countries competition. Second the 
pricing power of capital intensive industries tends to increase due to international specialization and hence reinforces the 
positive effect on the pricing power of the average domestic producer. As a result, openness to low cost countries tends at the 
same time to reduce the index for intra-industry trade in the mature economy but to raise the average pricing power of 
domestic producers. This implies in particular that markups in the mature economy become more procyclical when trade is 
more inter-industry. Hence with a lower intra-industry trade index, the Phillips curve becomes steeper which is then 
consistent with our empirical results.   9
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section lays down the econometric 
methodology and presents the data used in estimations. Import price inflation pass-through is 
investigated in section 3. The role of intra-industry trade is introduced and studied in section 4. 
Finally conclusions are drawn in section 5. 
 
 
II.  DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY. 
 
The basic specification we build on our empirical investigation is a standard Phillips curve 
equation which relates contemporaneous CPI inflation πt to lagged CPI inflation πt-1 and 
contemporaneous output gap yt 
  t t t t y ε β π β α π + + + = − 1 1 0  (1) 
 
the time indicator being t and ε being an error term. Because the dataset we use is a panel of 
countries, the empirical specification we estimate is slightly modified to allow for fixed 
effects, i.e. cross country differences in the unconditional CPI inflation rate: 
  it it it i it y ε β π β α π + + + = − 1 1 0  (2) 
 
πit being CPI inflation in country i at time t and yit being the output gap in country i at time t. 
Estimating this equation with simple OLS or WITHIN estimators is known to be inconsistent 
due to the presence of both fixed effects and the lagged dependent variable as a right hand 
side variable. A standard method to deal with this problem consists first in differentiating the 
last equation as to get rid of fixed effects αi 
  () ( ) ( ) 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 − − − − − − + − + − = − it it it it it it it it y y ε ε β π π β π π  (3) 
 
Second the differentiated right hand side variables can be instrumented with two and three 
period lagged levels of the right hand side variables of equation (2). Validity of instruments 
can finally be tested with the standard Sargan test of validity of overidentifiying restrictions. 
  
A second method that can be used to deal with the specific problem of dynamic panel models 
with fixed effects consists is using the generalized method of moments (GMM) methodology 
developed by Arellano and Bond. GMM takes advantage of the fact that lagged variables can   10
provide a large number of instruments by building an optimal instrument matrix which can 
considerably raise estimation efficiency. However it should be noted that that the Arrellano 
and Bond methodology is designed for panel where the cross-section dimension is much 
larger than the time dimension (small T, large N) which is not necessarily the case in the 
panel we consider. 
 
The methodology we use consists in using equation (3) as a benchmark. To capture the effect 
of globalization on inflation we use a number of variables that we include as right hand side 
variables following two different specifications. One consists simply in adding these variables 
on their own to capture whether these variables do influence the level of inflation. For 
example considering that the variable x is import price inflation equation (4) can tell whether 
and how much does import price inflation affect CPI inflation. 
  it it it it it x y ε β β π β π ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − 2 1 1 0  (4) 
 
The second possibility consists in testing whether the variables representing globalization 
influence CPI inflation not through its level but through its sensitivity to standard inflation 
determinants such as the output gap for instance. To test this possibility we build a linear 
interaction variable which assumes that the effect on CPI inflation of a change in say the 
output gap will be linear in the globalization variable we consider. 
  it it it it it it x y y ε β β π β π ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − 2 1 1 0  (5) 
 
 For instance if we test the impact of the import to GDP ratio on the sensitivity of inflation to 
the output gap, then we estimate equation (5) where x is the import to GDP ratio and other 
variables are the same as previously. 
 
We identify three limits to the empirical exercise we carry out.  
First, we need to deal with the traditional problem of the Lucas critique. The results that come 
out of the empirical estimations can be regarded as the “true underlying effect” on CPI 
inflation of the variables we consider. These results can also be regarded as a mix between the 
“true underlying effect” and changes in economic policies that follow the shocks on this 
variable. Take for instance, import price inflation. If as will be detailed below, the effect of 
import price inflation on CPI inflation is found to be relatively small, this could be that the 
CPI inflation is really relatively insensitive to import price inflation, but it can also be the case   11
that domestic economic policies display dampening effects of import price inflation. For 
example fiscal authorities can decide to cut taxes when oil prices go up as to reduce the 
negative effects of higher import price inflation. However this certainly participates in 
dampening the effect of the import price inflation on CPI inflation. Similarly, if monetary 
policy contributes to maintain a stable inflation rate by reducing interest rates when inflation 
is below objective and raising them when inflation is above objective, then it ends up being 
clear that estimated effects are bound to be rather small. 
Is this identification problem a concern for our study? We think no for two reasons. First, the 
above examples show that identification is a relevant concern as long as we observe rather 
small effects, the question being, are these real small effects or are these large effects but 
dampened through economic policy changes? Hence when it is claimed that globalization has 
had no impact on inflation, this may be due to the fact that we only observe the sum of 
globalization and economic policy impacts on inflation. However, the point of this paper is 
precisely to claim that there is some evidence that globalization has had some impact on 
inflation. Hence, we provide evidence that globalization does affect inflation in spite of the 
theoretical possibility that the effects we try to capture are in fact much larger which 
reinforces our argument. The second reason why identification is less a concern for our study 
than in the general case is that we focus much less on level than on interaction effects for 
while the Lucas critique is more relevant for the former than the latter. 
 
The second limit to our empirical exercise is specific to the estimation of interaction effects. 
In equation (5), the term β2 can be interpreted as the marginal effect of the interaction term yx 
if and only if the terms the variables y and x are also present as right hand side variables on 
their own. Hence to interpret properly β2 as an interaction effect, we need to estimate the 
following equation 
  it it it it it it it x x y y ε β β β π β π ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − 3 2 1 1 0  (6) 
 
Otherwise β2 can represent an interaction effect but can also represent the effect of the x 
variable on its own. In the example given above where y is the output gap and x is the import 
to GDP ratio, a significant coefficient β2 could either be that openness to imports 
significantly affects the sensitivity of CPI inflation to the output gap but it could also 
represent the direct impact of openness to imports on CPI inflation. There is however one 
reason why we prefer equation (5) to equation (6). It is that we want to stick to the Phillips   12
curve framework in which right hand side variables that affect inflation are all nominal except 
the output gap. Although it may be argued that it is always possible to run a regression 
whatever its consistency, introducing “real” right hand side variables is contradictory with the 
underlying framework our estimations are based on. It must be the case that the estimation we 
carry out be grounded on a formal model which would link inflation to some real variable 
such as openness to trade or competition for instance. This has been carried out in previous 
studies (See Romer 1993, Lane 1997 or Temple 1999). However these studies are concerned 
with the determinants of long run inflation not with the cyclical properties of inflation as we 
are. 
 
Finally a third concern deals with the dynamic structure of the empirical specification we use. 
A large body of the recent literature on Phillips curves has stressed the importance of 
forward-lookingness in the inflation process so that it is now common to introduce expected 
inflation as a right hand side variable. While we do acknowledge that this can be a limit to the 
argument we want to build, we prefer a simple specification where inflation depends on its lag 
first because the robustness of dynamic models with forward looking variables can be quite 
low, this implying that our results could also lack robustness. Second we try to follow the 
literature on the globalization inflation debate as to provide evidence that can easily be 
compared and contrasted with those of other studies. Finally while every econometric 
refinement in the inflation process is in theory welcome, it is important to keep in mind that 
the marginal complexity should be trade-off against the marginal gain the refinement brings. 
In the case of introducing forward lookingness, it is not clear how large is the latter compared 
to the former as far as the issues we are interested in are concerned. 
 
We focus our study on the industrialized OECD countries, i.e. we abstract from Central and 
Eastern European countries (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and the Check Republic), and 
emerging markets (Mexico, Turkey and South Korea). We end up with a panel of twenty one 
countries. The largest time period we consider is 1980-2005. Because the study makes 
extensive use of lagged variables, and because all data is not always available for the whole 
1980-2005 period, the effective time period for estimation can be much shorter. We consider 
annual or alternatively quarterly data. We however only present results obtained with annual 
data because results with quarterly data are qualitatively identical and quantitatively close. 
Moreover some data (especially indicators based on sector level data) do not exist at higher 
than annual frequency.   13
 
Data used come from OECD and CHELEM datasets. The hard macroeconomic data (CPI, 
GDP deflator, output gap, imports, total, commodity and non-commodity import prices, unit 
labour cost) come from the Economic Outlook dataset. Data on the composition of imports 
comes from the OECD Monthly Trade Statistics database which contains a desegregation of 
imports by country of origin or by good following the standard international trade 
classification which essentially is a one digit desegregation of import flows. Data on intra-
industry trade and import penetration is computed on the basis of data for imports and exports 
measured at the two-digit industrial level for the manufacturing sector following the 
international standard industrial classification. The OECD STAN (Structural Analysis 
Indicators) database does provide this type of information. We also use the CHELEM dataset 
which provides data on trade flows for 70 different categories of goods to compute the intra-
industry trade index. 
 
 
III.  INVESTIGATING IMPORT PRICE EFFECTS 
 
We first estimate the benchmark equation (1) which relates CPI inflation to lagged CPI 
inflation and output gap8. Table 1 provides the results of this estimation. The first column 
shows the simple WITHIN estimates which provide unexpected coefficients with a negative 
persistence in inflation and no significant cyclical effects. In the following columns, we try to 
solve the endogeneity issue using instrumental variables estimation.  
Table 1 
E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation O L S I VI VI VI VI VI V
Lagged CPI Inflation -0.189*** 0.463*** 0.389*** 0.686*** 0.693*** 0.524*** 0.708***
(4.77) (4.72) (4.42) (4.61) (4.74) (4.52) (4.87)
Output Gap -0.043 0.239* 0.252** 0.345** 0.375** 0.295** 0.372**
(0.75) (1.82) (2.37) (2.23) (2.51) (2.56) (2.47)
Sargan Test (p. value) - 0.003 0.021 0.037 0.111 0.134 0.184
Observations 559 514 514 514 514 514 514
Number of cross sections 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log 
of GDP. All estimations include country dummies not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute value of t 
statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hausman test carried out for IV 
estimations always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. Cf. appendix for instrument list for IV estimations. 
Standard Phillips Curve Estimations
 
                                                    
8 We have also estimated a similar specification with time dummies on the right hand side and GDP deflator in place of CPI to 
check whether our results can be extended in these cases. No estimation has proven to be contradictory with the results 
presented. Results can be found in appendix “Robustness Tests”.    14
The results of these estimations are more in line with the common wisdom on Phillips curve 
parameters, i.e. positive and relatively large persistence in inflation on the one hand and 
positive but relatively low correlation with cyclical variations in output especially when 
compared with predictions of models with nominal rigidity on the other hand. Estimations in 
columns 5-7, for which the null of instruments validity cannot be rejected provide relatively 
close results: inflation persistence between 0.5 and 0.7 and sensitivity to output gap between 
0.3 and 0.37.  
 
We next introduce import price inflation as a possible determinant of CPI inflation. As 
previously, we first provide the WITHIN estimates and then correct for the endogeneity 
problem in the next columns. The striking point in these estimates is the relative insensitivity 
of the effect of import price inflation to CPI inflation to the estimation method and to the set 
of instruments included. The estimated effect of import price inflation on CPI inflation ranges 
from 0.11 to 0.15, these figures being consistent with the estimates found in the literature 
(from 0.1 and 0.2). Moreover the magnitude of the import price inflation effect is relatively 
insensitive to the introduction time dummies or control variables such as monetary policy 
credibility9. 
Table 2 
E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation O L S I VI VI VI VI VI V
Lagged CPI inflation -0.082** 0.413*** 0.367*** 0.588*** 0.625*** 0.530*** 0.516***
(2.16) (5.06) (4.88) (4.36) (4.62) (5.03) (4.92)
Output Gap -0.061 0.261** 0.177* 0.333** 0.333** 0.229** 0.224**
(1.15) (2.32) (1.86) (2.58) (2.51) (2.16) (2.13)
Import price inflation 0.145*** 0.199*** 0.121*** 0.140** 0.122** 0.113*** 0.117***
(10.00) (3.95) (4.63) (2.07) (1.79) (3.94) (4.10)
Sargan Test (p. value) - 0.016 0.067 0.187 0.206 0.447 0.487
Observations 559 514 514 514 514 514 514
Number of cross sections 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of
log of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. All estimations include country
dummies not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hausman test carried out for IV estimations always reject the null that
OLS estimation is consistent. Cf. appendix for instrument list for IV estimations. 
Phillips Curve with import price inflation
 
 
Hence a 1 pp increase in import price inflation produces an instantaneous rise in CPI inflation 
between 0.11 and 0.15 pp. Moreover given the estimated inflation persistence, the effect of a 
transitory shock on import price inflation is approximately twice smaller each following year. 
                                                    
9 Cf. estimation in appendix, Table 1 “Phillips Curve with import price inflation and monetary policy credibility”   15
For instance the effect on CPI inflation of a 1 pp increase in import price inflation is about 
one hundred times smaller after three years. Estimations on quarterly data essentially provide 
similar magnitudes (both for import price inflation effect and inflation persistence) although, 
the frequency being higher, the effects disappear much more rapidly. Hence if globalization 
affects CPI inflation exclusively through import price inflation, given CPI inflation estimated 
persistence, a 1pp permanent decrease in CPI inflation requires a permanent decrease in 
import price inflation above 4pp. No country in our sample shows so large a ratio of import 
price decline to CPI inflation decline10. 













































































CPI inflation decline is the difference between the average CPI inflation rate over 1980-1985 and the average CPI inflation rate 
over 2000-2005. Import price inflation decline is the difference between the average import price inflation rate over 1980-1985 
and the average import price inflation rate over 2000-2005 
 
Are these small effects of import price inflation on CPI inflation evidence that globalization 
has had very tiny effects on inflation? Yes as long as globalization impacts inflation 
exclusively through import price inflation. No if other channels need to be considered. 
Among other channels that need to be considered lies the volume of imports:  it is likely that 
the effect of import price inflation depend on the import penetration. To put it briefly, it is 
reasonable to believe that CPI inflation in an almost closed economy is less sensitive to 
                                                    
10 This exercise is based on the implicit assumption that CPI inflation can move in the long run with import price inflation 
which could appear as contradictory with the widespread view that inflation is in the long run under the control of the 
monetary authority. There are three reasons our exercise is not necessarily contradictory with this view. First the long run 
optimal inflation rate the central bank sets may be related to the rate of import price inflation. Second in the approach we 
consider here, changes in import prince inflation are exogenous while in the long run, they are probably endogenous as 
monetary policy also affects the nominal exchange rate. Finally even if optimal long run inflation is independent of import 
price inflation, it is likely that the disinflation effect of imports creates an opportunity for the central bank to move from a 
high to a low inflation steady state at a social lower cost. Hence that import price inflation has a long run effect on CPI 
inflation should not be regarded as contradictory with the view that long run inflation is exclusively determined by the central 
bank.   16
import price inflation than in a fully open economy. Hence it could be that the small effect of 
import price inflation on CPI inflation simply reflects that countries in our sample are 
relatively closed to imports in the sense that trade represents a relatively small share of their 
GDP. This possibility is examined in the next regressions. 
Table 3 
E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation O L S I VI VI VI VI VI V
Lagged CPI inflation -0.088** 0.478*** 0.746*** 0.708*** 0.586*** 0.591*** 0.726***
(2.24) (5.87) (5.27) (5.07) (5.64) (5.67) (5.14)
Output Gap -0.053 0.354*** 0.481*** 0.487*** 0.290*** 0.302*** 0.513***
(0.99) (2.93) (3.16) (3.26) (2.60) (2.71) (3.42)
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 0.445*** 0.604*** 0.401** 0.381** 0.331*** 0.324*** 0.358**
(10.72) (5.30) (2.55) (2.47) (4.28) (4.19) (2.34)
Sargan Test (p. value) - 0.000 0.003 0.036 0.095 0.114 0.137
Observations 537 492 492 492 492 492 492
Number of cross sections 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log
of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total
imports (goods and sevices) to GDP. Import price inflation * Imports to GDP is the product of Import price inflation and
Imports to GDP. All estimations include country dummies not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute
v a l u eo fts t a t i s t i c si np a r e n t h e s e s .*s i g n i f i c a n ta t1 0 % ;* *s i g n i f i c a n ta t5 % ;* * *s i g n i f i c a n ta t1 % .H a u s m a nt e s tc a r r i e d
out for IV estimations always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. Cf. appendix for instrument list for IV
estimations. 
Phillips Curve with interaction between import price inflation and imports to GDP ratio
 
 
When CPI inflation is regressed on the interaction of imports to GDP and import price 
inflation, the estimated effect is expected to be around one if the ratio of imports to GDP is a 
good approximation of the total share of imports in the typical consumption basket. 
According to such estimation, a rise in import price inflation would hit CPI inflation 
proportionally to the imports to GDP ratio of the economy.  



































Chart 2   17
Estimations however show that the effect is roughly one third of what would be expected on 
the basis of a simple calculation. Hence assuming an import to GDP ratio around 30%, a 
positive 1pp shock to import price inflation raises contemporaneous CPI inflation around 0.10 
pp.  
There are possibly two reasons why the estimated coefficient of the imports to GDP import 
price inflation is so low. One is that the import to GDP ratio is much higher than the actual 
share of imports in the typical consumption basket that is used to determine the CPI. Another 
possible explanation is that only some type of shocks on import price inflation -negative 
shocks for instance- are transmitted to CPI inflation while others –inflationary shocks 
possibly- are dampened. While this hypothesis is difficult to test with macro data and left for 
further work, some preliminary evidence at the sector level shows that there is indeed some 
asymmetry in the transmission of shocks11. What we can however easily test at the macro 
level whether the impact of import price inflation on CPI inflation depends or not on the 
volume of imports. Intuitively that should be the case. 
Table 4 
E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation O L S I VI VI VI VI VI V
Lagged CPI inflation -0.078** 0.475*** 0.730*** 0.473*** 0.545*** 0.684*** 0.693***
(1.98) (5.93) (5.18) (5.90) (4.05) (8.48) (8.57)
Output Gap -0.052 0.369*** 0.478*** 0.369*** 0.237 0.496** 0.505**
(0.97) (3.08) (3.24) (3.09) (4.52) (2.22) (2.21)
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 0.295*** 0.143 0.169 0.170 -0.260 -0.008 0.038
(3.38) (0.57) (0.57) (0.67) (1.25) (0.04) (0.22)
Import price inflation 0.061* 0.192* 0.099 0.186* 0.210*** 0.175** 0.158**
(1.94) (1.95) (0.81) (1.88) (2.81) (1.94) (1.96)
Sargan Test (p. value) - 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.544 0.135 0.233
Observations 537 492 492 492 514 492 492
Number of cross sections 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log
of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total
imports (goods and sevices) to GDP. Import price inflation * Imports to GDP is the product of Import price inflation and
Imports to GDP. All estimations include country dummies not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute
value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hausman test carried out
for IV estimations always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. Cf. appendix for instrument list for IV
estimations. 
Deciding between import price inflation and the interaction with imports to GDP
 
 
Econometric estimations however show that it is definitely not: in the above table a horse race 
is run between import price inflation and the interaction of import price inflation with imports 
to GDP. Apart from the simple WITHIN estimation (which is there for illustrative purpose 
only as the specification test of OLS validity is rejected) all other estimations show that the 
significant impact of import price inflation on CPI inflation does not go through the volume 
                                                    
11 Cf. Guilloux, Kharroubi « Evidence on the globalisation impact on producer prices at the industry level » forthcoming 2008.   18
of imports to GDP but is constant whatever the volume of imports to GDP with this last effect 
being between 0.16 and 0.21. This means that openness to trade has no significant impact on 
the sensitivity of CPI inflation to import price inflation12. 
This finding has two consequences. First it implies that every thing else equal, globalization 
defined as the increase in trade flows, does not significantly impact the relationship between 
import price inflation and CPI inflation. Whether globalization contributes to increase or 
decrease inflation through higher or lower import price inflation, a higher trade exposure does 
not significantly amplify these effects. Hence based on this result, it can be claimed that 
globalization has had no impact on the inflation process. The view that larger exposition to 
trade with emerging “low cost” countries tends to amplify the disinflation mechanism -the 
entrance of developing countries into world trade allowing mature economies to import a 
bunch of goods at much cheaper rates- is wrong. Secondly this finding can be interpreted as 
the fact that import price inflation is a sufficient statistics of the impact of foreign influence 
on domestic CPI inflation in the sense that changes in the composition of trade flows – 
emerging “low cost” countries substituting mature economies” – are already embedded in the 
import price inflation variable as greater exposition to trade with “low cost” countries may 
reduce import price inflation proportionally to the importance of these trade flows. What 
remains puzzling is why the volume effect –the increase in total imports to GDP- which 
cannot be embedded into the import price inflation variable has no significant explanatory 
power. One reason can be that the first order effect of the last globalization wave has been not 
so much an increase in the size of trade flows but rather more a change in the composition of 
trade flows, which are more and more North-South trade and less and less North-North trade. 
During the 80’s the first order change in trade in G7 was the composition of trade, the volume 
being roughly constant as a share of GDP. On the contrary, the 90’s show an increase in the 
share of Asian countries in G7 imports that is approximately similar to the increase in overall 
imports to GDP.  
We hence need another explanation to account for the fact that the volume of imports to GDP 
does not significantly impact the pass-through of import price inflation to CPI inflation. One 
other possible explanation to this puzzling finding is that the effect of the volume of trade 
                                                    
12  This result is robust to the inclusion of control variables such as monetary policy credibility. Cf. table 2 in appendix 
“Robustness tests”   19
may be relevant but only for some type of goods. This is the possibility we investigate in the 
next regressions13. 




















Share of Imports from China + NIC in Total Imports
Total Imports to GDP  
Chart 3 
Note: China + NIC = China, Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand. Source CHELEM 
 
Intuitively the impact of import price inflation on CPI inflation should be qualitatively 
different depending upon whether the goods that are being imported are also being produced 
domestically or not. In the latter case -where imports are not substitutes to domestic output-, 
import price inflation should typically impact CPI inflation according to the volume of goods 
imported because there is no possible impact on domestic producers’ pricing behaviour. On 
the contrary, in the former case -where imports are substitutes to domestic output-, import 
price inflation could impact CPI inflation independently of the volume of goods imported 
because domestic producers may take into account foreign competition brought by imports in 
their pricing behaviour. To examine this possibility, we divide imports into two categories, 
commodity and non-commodity imports. The simple conjecture we base on our study is that 
non-commodity imports are more substitutes to domestic output in industrialized OECD 
countries than commodity imports. If a country imports commodity goods, it means that it 
lacks the natural resources to produce these commodities. On the contrary, there is no need to 
import commodities for a country that already produces these commodities. For instance a 
country like Japan which lacks natural resources for both agricultural output and raw 
materials shows the highest share of commodity imports in total imports in our sample (40% 
                                                    
13The effect of import price inflation on CPI inflation could also be unrelated to the ratio of imports to GDP if changes in 
import price inflation were due to world global shocks. However as will be shown in the next sections, changes to import 
price inflation have essentially been country specific which precludes this possibility.    20
in 2005). On the contrary Norway which is an oil exporter country shows a much lower share 
of commodity imports in total imports (more than twice lower). 
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Separating import price inflation into commodity vs. non commodity import price inflation 
yields two interesting results. First consistent with the interpretation linking the goods that are 
being imported with how easily imports can substitute domestic output, commodity import 
price inflation is found to affect CPI inflation but only through the volume of commodity 
import price inflation. 
Table 5 
E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation O L S I VI VI VI VI VI V
Lagged CPI inflation 0.199*** 0.598*** 0.497*** 0.497*** 0.478*** 0.588*** 0.584***
(4.76) (7.60) (6.90) (4.87) (7.55) (9.40) (8.99)
Output Gap 0.124*** 0.269*** 0.217*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.273*** 0.269***
(3.22) (4.00) (3.63) (3.55) (5.18) (5.8) (5.99)
Commodity Import price inflation 0.012** 0.006 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 0.005
(2.03) (0.27) (1.15) (1.09) (1.74) (0.33)
Commodity Import price inflation * Com. Imports to GDP 0.035 0.153 0.414** 0.414*** 0.418** 0.192** 0.236***
(0.64) (0.72) (2.53) (2.17) (2.88) (1.79) (3.72)
Non Com. Import price inflation 0.065*** 0.087 0.087* 0.087* 0.092** 0.083* 0.073***
(2.63) (1.40) (1.70) (1.76) (2.11) (1.86) (2.82)
Non Com. Import price infl. * Non Com. Imports to GDP 0.033 -0.052 0.062 0.062 0.035 -0.043
(0.34) (0.25) (0.34) (0.36) (0.28) (0.30)
Sargan Test (p. value) - 0.877 0.013 0.013 0.047 0.981 0.99
Observations 462 419 419 419 419 419 419
Number of cross sections 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Separating into commodity and non commodity import price inflation
Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP. Import
price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports (goods and sevices) to GDP.
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP is the product of Import price inflation and Imports to GDP. All estimations include country dummies
not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%. Hausman test carried out for IV estimations always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. Cf. appendix for
instrument list for IV estimations.   
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On the contrary non commodity import price inflation affects CPI inflation similarly whatever 
the volume of non commodity imports. An increase in the volume of non commodity imports 
has therefore no impact on CPI inflation. An interpretation to this qualitative difference can 
be based on the difference in competition: non-commodity goods face contestability in the 
sense that the pricing power of producers is necessarily limited by the fact that foreign 
producers can provide the domestic market with goods that can be relatively close. Even if the 
actual volume of imports is low, the threat of large imports triggered by arbitrage 
opportunities in prices generates an impact on domestic inflation. On the contrary this line of 
reasoning does not apply to commodity goods which are imported in as much as they cannot 
be produced domestically (think of oil for instance). To put it differently, a law of one price 
holds to a large extent for non commodity goods while nothing as such holds for commodities. 
Hence the prevalence of non commodity imports in total imports can account for the previous 
result that total import price inflation affects CPI inflation independently of the volume of 
total imports. Second considering a country where commodity imports roughly represent 10% 
of GDP (average value for 2005 in our sample), estimations in column 6 and 7 show that the 
effect on CPI inflation of 1pp increase in non commodity import price inflation is 
approximately three to four times larger than the effect of a 1pp increase in commodity import 
price inflation. Hence considering the case where import price inflation for non-commodity 
decreases while it increases for commodity goods, a decrease in non-commodity import price 
inflation reduces CPI inflation as long as it is at least 30% larger than the increase in 
commodity import price inflation. 
Effect on CPI inflation of 
4pp increase in commodity import price inflation 
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The implications of these results for the possible future impact of globalization on inflation 
are quite straightforward. Because globalization tends on the one hand to increase commodity 
goods inflation as well as raise OECD countries commodity imports especially as reserves in 
traditional oil producers (the UK for instance) are getting exhausted. Because on the other 
hand nominal convergence in developing countries will at some point translate into higher 
non-commodity import price inflation for OECD countries (especially for those that have 
large trade links with emerging economies for manufactured goods), it is likely that 
globalization will contribute to raise CPI inflation in OECD countries. 
 
These results provide evidence that the nature of goods traded is fundamental to properly 
evaluate the effects of openness to trade on inflation. More precisely substitutability between 
domestic output and imports seems to be a key element to evaluate the relationship between 
inflation and openness. While the previous analysis has provided a simple dichotomy in 
imports, it is possible to dig in this way more systematically. This is what the next section 
tries to achieve.  
 
 
IV.  TRADE STRUCTURE AND THE INFLATION PROCESS. 
 
Traditional trade theory has for long been confronted to the difficulty of accounting for major 
trade flows. While the latter are essentially about trading goods that can be quite similar to 
what importing economies do already produce, traditional trade theory –the Hescksher-Ohlin-
Samuelson (HOS) approach in particular- has highlighted the importance of relative factor 
endowments, pointing to the fact that economies should import goods that are relatively 
intensive in the domestically scarce factor. These factor endowments motives for trade are 
important but do not seem to apply well to the major part of developed countries trade flows. 
Recent work on these issues has shown that trade could occur for some goods already 
domestically produced as long as consumers exhibit a taste for variety and competition is 
endogenous to the number of producers for a given market. This type of trade named as intra-
industry trade is opposed to inter-industry trade which is well described with a standard HOS 
model.  
The structure of trade, i.e. imports as a substitute or a complement to domestic output, can 









where IIT is the intra-industry trade index for a given sector j, X is the value of exports and M 
the value of imports for the given sector j. When the value of exports is relatively similar to 
the value of imports in a given sector, the index is close to one. On the contrary when exports 
are much lower or much larger than imports, then the index is close to zero. At the macro 













trade in all sectors j being taken into account. IIT close to 1 indicates that the nature of 
exports is close to that of imports whereas IIT close to 0 reflects that imports are relatively 
different from exports. There are four limits to the use of these indexes for our purpose. The 
most obvious one is that the intra-industry trade index grasps the proximity between imports 
and exports, not between imports and domestic output. While this is theoretically a problem, 
we try to address it using an index for import penetration ratio computed for industry j as 
j j j
j





Domestic output for a given sector j is Qj. At the country level, the import penetration ratio is 












A large value for the import penetration ratio implies that domestic demand is mainly fulfilled 
by imports and domestic production tends to be exported whereas a value close to zero that 
domestic demand is mainly satisfied by domestic production. The second limit with the intra 
industry Trade index relates to the scope of these indexes build on data for the manufacturing 
sector whose share in total output is shrinking and does not take into account the recent wave 
of services off-shoring which can be a powerful mechanism to influence domestic inflation in 
mature economies. Thirdly the reliability of these indexes highly depends on the precision of 
the industrial classification they are built on, especially the desegregation level. In what 
follows we use two intra-industry trade indexes, one coming from the STAN OECD dataset 
containing approximately 25 different industries and another one coming from the CHELEM   24
CEPII dataset based on decomposition for 70 different industries. Finally, the Grubel-Lloyd 
index computed at the macroeconomic level can be sensitive to the global trade balance of the 
economy. While some measures correcting that bias do exist in the literature, they have not 
proven to bring sizeable improvements. To make sure this applies to our study we provide 
estimations where we control for the trade balance (see appendix, Robustness tests, Table 7) 
The upside to using this type of measures is also clearly identified. Among these, lies the very 
notion that globalization effects are fundamentally incentive effects that do not necessarily 
materialize with trade flows. Nor do trade flows grasp these incentive effects as they probably 
emerge when incentive mechanisms fail to achieve the necessary changes. To put it 
differently in an open economy, the absence of trade flows can be a sign of integration 
because this means that domestic producers modify their prices as to eliminate any arbitrage 
opportunity. On the contrary observing trade flows typically means that some arbitrage 
opportunity that domestic agents have not filled on is being exploited by foreigners. The 
larger the share of domestic producers that are confronted with the law of one price, the 
higher the integration and the lower the trade flows. The basic advantage of the intra-industry 
trade index is precisely to capture the intensity of this incentive channel whatever the volume 
of trade. 
The intensity of intra-industry trade can affect inflation in two ways. First it can affect the 
sensitivity CPI inflation to the output gap and second it can influence the sensitivity CPI 
inflation to import price inflation.  
Table 6 
E s t i m a t i o n s 12345678
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV
Lagged CPI inflation -0.086** 0.482*** 0.768*** 0.716*** 0.007*** 0.392** 0.552*** 0.549***
(2.02) (3.12) (4.15) (4.58) (0.18) (2.48) (5.51) (5.31)
Output Gap -0.412* 2.155*** 2.932** 2.866** -0.001 0.310*** 0.397*** 0.390***
(1.85) (4.79) (2.23) (2.42) (0.02) (3.82) (3.22) (3.29)
Output Gap * Imports to GDP -0.794* 0.130 0.384 0.472
(1.74) (0.21) (0.45) (0.53)
Output Gap * IIT 0.010*** -0.028*** -0.039** -0.038**
(3.21) (4.22) (1.99) (2.19)
Import price inflation 0.149*** 0.260* 0.153*** 0.174*** 0.327*** 0.483*** 0.372*** 0.409***
(9.24) (1.87) (2.72) (2.94) (7.79) (2.80) (3.30) (2.69)
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 0.629*** 0.502 0.396 0.223
(6.36) (1.55) (1.41) (0.88)
Import price inflation * IIT -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(10.53) (2.83) (2.84) (2.77)
Sargan Test (p. value) - 0.001 0.065 0.440 - 0.004 0.023 0.230
Observations 472 428 428 428 493 450 450 450
Number of cross sections 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Globalization represented by IIT and/or imports to GDP
Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP.
Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports (goods and
sevices) to GDP. Import price inflation * Imports to GDP is the product of Import price inflation and Imports to GDP. IIT is the Intra
Industry Trade index measured with the Grubel Loyd method. All estimations include country dummies not reported. All
estimations include a constant term. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%. Hausman test carried out for IV estimations always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. Cf. appendix
for instrument list for IV estimations.     25
 
In columns 1 to 4, we test whether intra-industry trade affects the sensitivity CPI inflation to 
the output gap, i.e. the slope of the Phillips curve. Instrumental variable regressions (2-4) 
show that the interaction coefficient between the output gap and the intra-industry trade index 
is significant and negative while the interaction of the output gap and the imports to GDP 
ratio is not. This means that the intra industry trade tends to dampen the effect of the output 
gap on CPI inflation. The slope of Phillips curve is lower when the intra-industry trade index 
is lower, i.e. when imports and exports are closer substitutes. Hence higher index for intra-
industry trade index is a candidate to account for the general phenomenon of Phillips curve 
flattening. On the contrary the volume of goods imported has no significant impact on the 
slope of the Phillips curve, this last result being in line with the literature.  
The economic intuition for this result is straightforward. A positive shock on output gap is 
less inflationary when domestic producers are more constrained by global competition. 
Raising prices in such case would induce market shares losses, the loss being larger when 
imports are close substitutes to domestic output. This result systematizes the intuition of Borio 
and Filardo (2007): imports can act as a buffer in the domestic supply and demand 
equilibrium, hence reducing the sensitivity of domestic inflation to domestic output. However 
for this property to hold, we need that imports can easily replace domestic output in terms of 
the goods consumed. This is what we capture through with our intra-industry trade measure. 
Besides avoiding the caveats of foreign output gap data building, intra-industry trade provides 
a simple measure of how globalization has contributed to the decline in the inflation 
sensitivity to domestic economic slack. 
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Chart 6    26
 
To measure of the magnitude of the effect on Phillips curve flattening, we derive the change 
in the slope of the Phillips curve when moving from the first to the third quartile of our 
sample distribution of intra-industry trade. The 25% and 75% percentiles for IIT being 
respectively around 54% and 77%, the slope of the Phillips curve would go down from 0.8 to 
approximately zero14. 
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Chart 7  
 
In columns 5 to 8 of table 6, we use the same method to test whether intra industry trade 
accounts for low import price pass through. As in the previous case, the interaction between 
import price inflation and intra-industry trade has a significant and negative effect on CPI 
inflation while the interaction between import price inflation and the imports to GDP ratio is 
not significant (columns 6-8). The higher the intra-industry trade index, the weaker the 
sensitivity of CPI inflation to import price inflation. Hence a positive shock on import price 
inflation produce a lower increase in CPI inflation as domestic producers can more easily 
substitute imports when trade is more intra-industry.  
Meanwhile, this result highlights a paradox. While the literature has concluded that 
globalization has had no significant role on inflation based on the low pass-through of import 
price inflation to CPI inflation, we argue that this low pass-through is indeed due to a specific 
pattern of globalization in industrialized economies, the importance of intra vs. inter industry 
                                                    
14 The green line represents the average estimated slope. The dashed lines represent the average estimated slope plus or minus 
one standard deviation.   27
trade. These shows that import prices do not constitute a sufficient statistics to assess the 
effects of globalization on inflation. 
 
 
V.  TRADE STRUCTURE AND THE INFLATION PROCESS: SOME ROBUSTNESS CHECKS. 
 
The impact of intra-industry trade.  
The last regressions provide the surprising conclusion that the ratio of imports to GDP does 
not play any role in the relationship between on the one hand CPI inflation and on the other 
hand output gap and import price inflation. To check whether this conclusion is robust we 
introduce another term to capture whether the impact of the trade structure on these 
relationships depends upon the volume of trade. Is it the case that in a more open country, CPI 
inflation will be significantly more sensitive to import price inflation for a given level of 
intra-industry trade index? Regressions in appendix15 show that this is not the case. Whatever 
the relationship and the specification considered, when IIT is introduced, the interaction of 
IIT and imports to GDP is never a significant determinant of the relationship between CPI 
inflation and the output gap or import price inflation. More generally the impact of IIT on the 
slope of the Philips curve and/or on the pass-through of import price inflation to CPI inflation 
could be a proxy for a number of features that affect or could affect the Phillips curve such as 
monetary policy credibility, labour market characteristics, or financial openness. We show in 
appendix (table7) that the impact of intra-industry trade is robust to the inclusion of all these 
variables16. 
 
Alternative measures of intra-industry trade.  
Two of the limits to the use of the index for IIT that were described above can be addressed. 
First we can focus on an aggregate import penetration ratio based on industry level data to get 
an idea how close are the goods imported to domestic output and not exports. Second we can 
use a more desegregate industry decomposition to compute another index for intra-industry 
trade. Results in appendix show that the industry decomposition has no particular impact on 
the results. In particular the index for IIT computed at a more desegregate level still has a 
significant and negative effect on the slope of the Phillips curve and it also tends to dampen 
the effect of import price inflation on CPI inflation. Hence the desegregation level of our 
                                                    
15 Cf. table 3, table 4 and table 5 in appendix “Robustness tests”   28
index for IIT does not seem to play any role in our results. As concerns using the import 
penetration ratio in place of the index for intra-industry trade, it seems that it is a significant 
determinant of the slope of the Phillips curve. Moreover when compared with the ratio of 
imports to GDP, it does a better job since the effect of the latter on the slope of the Phillips 
curve is not robust to the inclusion of time dummies.  
 
Intra-industry trade and competition.  
We have grounded our interpretation of the effect of intra-industry trade on the Phillips curve 
on the basis that intra-industry trade does proxy the pro-competitive effect of trade namely 
that countries where trade is more intra-industry are also countries where domestic producers 
are more constrained in their pricing by international competition.  However it may be argued 
that intra-industry trade arises when there is imperfect competition while inter-industry trade 
arises with perfect competition. Hence competition would be inversely related to the extent of 
intra-industry trade. This view is wrong for two reasons. First in new trade theory models 
(Melitz (2003)), globalization -as a fall in transaction and/or transport costs- tends to increase 
both competition and intra-industry trade. Hence the view that intra-industry trade is inversely 
related to competition is not always true from a theoretical point of view. Second and more 
importantly, empirical evidence at the industry level shows that the negative impact of 
industry productivity shocks on industry real output price inflation tends to be larger when the 
intra-industry trade index is larger17. Industries where the impact of supply shocks on prices 
tends to be larger are typically industries where competition is larger. Hence our interpretation 
is totally consistent with the industry level empirical evidence and higher intra-industry trade 
cannot be associated with lower competition. Finally the result that higher intra-industry trade 
tends to reduce the slope of the Philips curve relates not that much to the level of mark-ups 
but more to the cyclicality of mark-ups. In economies where intra-industry trade is larger 
mark-ups are less pro-cyclical because the capacity of domestic producers to raise prices in 
good times is lower when the threat of imports, i.e. intra-industry trade, is larger. Indeed, 
Cohen and Farhi (2001) argue that a key difference between the US and the European Phillips 
curves lies in the behaviour of mark-ups which are more counter-cyclical in Europe than in 
the US. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                   
16 Tables 8, 9 and 10 in appendix also show that the impact of intra-industry trade on the slope of the Phillips curve neither 
depends on a particular country of the sample nor on the particular sample period we use. 
17 Cf. Guilloux, Kharroubi « Evidence on the globalisation impact on producer prices at the sector level » forthcoming 2008   29
 
International output fragmentation.  
Up to now, we have considered intra-industry trade as trade in similar goods, i.e. goods that 
belong to the same industry. On the basis of this view we have interpreted intra-industry trade 
as a measure of the extent to which domestic producers are constrained by foreign 
competition. However given that the industry classifications we consider, it may likely be that 
intra-industry trade does not represent the constraint on the pricing power of domestic 
producers but the international fragmentation of production. For example if we consider some 
industry which implies some high tech components, developed countries may well export the 
high tech components to some developing countries where assembly is carried out. After the 
assembly stage, the final good may be imported to the country which had exported in the first 
place the high tech components. This type of trade typically contributes to raising indexes for 
intra-industry trade while that does not impact the pricing power of domestic producers. 
While our contestability based interpretation is not valid here, this case is however entirely 
consistent with a very simple interpretation: assuming that intra-industry trade reflects 
international output fragmentation, a higher index for intra-industry trade basically implies 
that domestic conditions have lower impact on the price of the final good as a large share of 
output is carried out abroad. This argument also applies for the pass-through of import prices 
to CPI inflation: higher intra-industry trade means that a larger share of imports is dedicated 
to be embedded into exports. Hence CPI inflation is less sensitive both to import price 
inflation and domestic output gap when intra-industry trade is larger or when output is more 
fragmented at the international level. 
 
GDP deflator and IIT.  
As import prices can create a « pro-competitive» effect on domestic producers, the impact of 
globalization on inflation should be observed not only on CPI inflation, but also on GDP 
deflator inflation. We hence carry out regression using GDP deflator instead of CPI inflation 
as a dependent variable (see Appendix, Robustness Tests, Table 5). The results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively close to those with CPI inflation.  
 
National or global shocks.  
A final possible limit to the argument that intra-industry trade tends to lower the sensitivity of 
inflation to both import price inflation and output gap relates to the nature of shocks that 
affect the output gap or the import price inflation. If an economy is hit by a global shock, this   30
implying that its trading partners are also hit by the same shock, there is no possibility to 
dampen the effect of such shock especially through higher intra-industry trade. Hence the 
interpretation we bring holds as long as shocks are mainly idiosyncratic to each country. To 
investigate this question we run a simple variance decomposition exercise on each of the 
import price inflation and output gap variables as follows 
it t i it c b a z + + =  
where z is the output gap of the import price inflation, b is a measure of global shocks that 
affect all countries in our sample and c is the idiosyncratic shock specific to both country i 
and time t. Based on this simple decomposition we compute for each country the following 
ratio 
()











2(x) is the conditional variance of x for each country i. What comes out of the next 
pictures is fairly clear. As far as import price inflation is concerned, for the vast majority of 
countries, the variance of idiosyncratic shocks is larger than the variance of global shocks. 







































Only in the case of Austria and Luxembourg is the variance of idiosyncratic shocks lower 
than the variance of global shocks. While the result is less clear cut for the output gap, it also 
holds. There are only three countries in the sample (Belgium, France and Italy) in which the 
variance of output gap shocks is higher for the global than for the idiosyncratic component.   31







































Hence the interpretation we have adopted is totally consistent with shocks on the output gap 
and/or on import price inflation which have mainly been idiosyncratic. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS. 
 
In this paper, we have tried to assess the impact of globalization on inflation. While different 
angles must be considered to get a broad view on this question, we have chosen to focus in 
this study on two main points; first the short run effect of globalization on inflation through 
the impact of import prices and second the impact of globalization on the inflation process 
and namely on the sensitivity of inflation to domestic output. We have derived two simple 
results on each of these issues. First the impact of import price inflation on CPI inflation is 
low and to a large extent independent of actual openness. Second the impact of domestic 
output gap on CPI inflation has been shown to depend negatively on the extent to which trade 
occurs within industries. Both these results are important for policy making. In the first case, 
it implies that further openness to trade does not necessarily imply that domestic inflation will 
be more sensitive to import price inflation. In the second case, if trade becomes more a within 
industry phenomenon, that can be goods news if inflationary pressures are less effective in 
producing inflation- but that can also be bad news because upward deviations from the 
inflation target will be more costly in terms of output loss. This highlights that globalization 
reinforces -through this last effect- the importance for monetary policy of anchoring inflation 
expectations through high credibility.   32
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APPENDIX. 
 
List of countries in the sample 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany (post 1991), Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, Great-Britain, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, New-Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, United States. 
 
Items under the “Commodity” heading 
Food and live animals, Beverages and tobacco, Crude materials, Mineral fuels, lubricants and 
related materials, Animal and vegetable oils and fats. 
 
Items under the “Non-Commodity” heading 
Chemicals and related products, Manufactured goods, Machinery and transport equipment, 




Headline CPI  Economic Outlook 
GDP deflator  Economic Outlook 
Domestic output gap  Economic Outlook 
Price of imports   Economic Outlook 
Imports (national level)  Economic Outlook 
Price of commodity imports  Economic Outlook 
Price of non commodity imports  Economic Outlook 
Commodity imports  Monthly Trade Statistics 
Non commodity imports  Monthly Trade Statistics 
Imports (industry level)  STAN and CHELEM 
Exports (industry level)  STAN and CHELEM 
Output (industry level)  STAN 
 
List of sectors used to compute the intra-industry trade index and the import 
penetration ratio based on STAN data 
Sector ISIC 
Food products, beverages and tobacco  15-16 
Textiles, Textile products, Leather and footwear  17-19 
Wood and products of wood and cork  20 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing  21-22 
Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel  23 
Chemicals and chemical products  24 
Rubber and plastics products  25 
Other non-metallic mineral products  26 
Basic metals  27 
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment  28 
Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.  29 
Office, accounting and computing machinery  30 
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c  31 
Radio, television and communication equipment  32 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  33   35
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  34 
Other transport equipment  35 
Manufacturing n.e.c; Recycling  36-37 
 
 
List of sectors used to compute the intra-industry trade index based on CHELEM data 
 
Code Sector  Code Sector 
BA Cement  FU Commercial  vehicles 
BB Ceramics  FV Ships 
BC Glass  FW Aeronautics 
CA  Iron Steel  GA  Basic inorganic chemicals 
CB Tubes  GB Fertilizers 
CC  Non ferrous metals  GC  Basic organic chemicals 
DA Yarns  fabrics  GD Paints 
DB Clothing  GE Toiletries 
DC Knitwear  GF Pharmaceuticals 
DD Carpets  GG Plastics 
DE Leather  GH Plastic  articles 
EA  Wood articles  GI  Rubber articles (incl. tyres) 
EB Furniture  HA Iron  ores 
EC  Paper  HB  Non ferrous ores 
ED Printing  HC Unprocessed  minerals  n.e.s. 
EE  Miscellaneous manuf. articles  IA  Coals 
FA  Metallic structures  IB  Crude oil 
FB  Miscellaneous hardware  IC  Natural gas 
FC Engines  IG Coke 
FD  Agricultural equipment  IH  Refined petroleum products 
FE Machine  tools  II  Electricity 
FF Construction  equipment  JA Cereals 
FG  Specialized machines  JB  Other edible agricultural prod 
FH  Arms  JC  Non-edible agricultural prod. 
FI  Precision instruments  KA  Cereal products 
FJ Clock  making  KB  Fats 
FK Optics  KC Meat 
FL  Electronic components  KD  Preserved meat/fish 
FM  Consumer electronics  KE  Preserved fruits 
FN Telecom  equipment  KF Sugar 
FO  Computer equipment  KG  Animal food 
FP  Domestic electrical appliances KH  Beverages 
FQ  Electrical equipment  KI  Manufactured tobaccos 
FR  Electrical apparatus  NA  Jewellery, works of art 
FS  Vehicles components  NB  Non-monetary gold 
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Estimations 1234567
CPI inflation lag2 X X
CPI inflation lag3 X X X X X
Output Gap lag2 X X X X X X
Output Gap lag3 X X X X X X
Import price inflation lag2 X X X
Import price inflation lag3 X X X
Time dummy XX
Estimations 1234567
CPI inflation lag2 X
CPI inflation lag3 X X X X
Output Gap lag2 X X X X X X
Output Gap lag3 X X X X X X
Import price inflation lag2 X X X X X X




CPI inflation lag2 X
CPI inflation lag3 X X
Output Gap lag2 X X X X X X
Output Gap lag3 X X X X X X
Import price inflation lag2 XX
Import price inflation lag3 XX
(Import price inflation* Imports to GDP) lag2 X X X X X X
(Import price inflation* Imports to GDP) lag3 X X X X X X
Robust
Time dummy XX
Table 1: list of instruments
Table 2: list of instruments
Table 3: list of instruments
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Estimations 1234567
CPI inflation lag2 X X
CPI inflation lag3 X X X
O u t p u t  G a p  l a g 2 XXXXXX
O u t p u t  G a p  l a g 3 XXXXXX
I m p o r t  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  l a g 2 XXXXXX
Import price inflation lag3 X X X X X
( I m p o r t  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n *  I m p o r t s  t o  G D P )  l a g 2 XXXXXX
(Import price inflation* Imports to GDP) lag3 X X X X X
Imports to GDP lag2




CPI inflation lag2 X X X X X
CPI inflation lag3 X X X X X
O u t p u t  G a p  l a g 2 XXXXXX
O u t p u t  G a p  l a g 3 XXXXXX
Import price inflation lag2
Import price inflation lag3
(Import price inflation* Imports to GDP) lag2
(Import price inflation* Imports to GDP) lag3
Imports to GDP lag2
Imports to GDP lag3
C o m m o d i t y  I m p o r t  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  l a g 2 XXXXXX
C o m m o d i t y  I m p o r t  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  l a g 3 XXXXXX
(Com. Import price inflation* Com. Imports to GDP) 
lag2 XXXXXX
(Com. Import price inflation* Com. Imports to GDP) 
lag3 XXXXXX
N o n  C o m .  I m p o r t  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  l a g 2 XXXXXX
N o n  C o m .  I m p o r t  p r i c e  i n f l a t i o n  l a g 3 XXXXXX
(Non Com. Import price inflation*Non Com. Imports 
to GDP) lag2 XXXXXX
(Non Com. Import price inflation* Non Com. Imports 
to GDP) lag3 XXXXXX
Commodity Imports to GDP lag2 X
Commodity Imports to GDP lag3 X X X
Commodity Imports to GDP lag4 XX
Non Commodity Imports to GDP lag2 X
Non Commodity Imports to GDP lag3 X X X
Non Commodity Imports to GDP lag4 X X X
Commodity Imports Share lag2 X X
Commodity Imports Share lag3 X X X
Commodity Imports Share lag4 X X X
Exports to GDP lag2 X
Exports to GDP lag3 X
Robust XX
Time dummy X X X
Estimations 12345678
CPI inflation lag2 X X
CPI inflation lag3 X X X X
Output Gap lag2 X X X
Output Gap lag3 X X X
(Output Gap* Imports to GDP) lag2 X X X
(Output Gap* Imports to GDP) lag3 X X X
(Output Gap* IIT) lag2 X X X
(Output Gap* IIT) lag3 X X X
Import price inflation lag2 XXX
Import price inflation lag3 XXX
(Import price inflation* Imports to GDP) lag2 X X X
(Import price inflation* Imports to GDP) lag3 X X X
(Import price inflation* IIIT) lag2 XXX
(Import price inflation* IIT) lag3 XXX
Robust
Time dummy
Table 5: list of instruments
Table 6: list of instruments






E s t i m a t i o n s 1234 5 6
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV
Lagged CPI inflation 0.506*** 0.455*** 0.303* 0.597*** 0.400** 0.297
(3.63) (3.19) (1.88) (6.71) (2.33) (1.40)
Output Gap 0.441** 0.289*** 0.220** 0.388*** 0.263*** 0.205***
(2.19) (3.50) (2.21) (3.31) (4.07)
Import price inflation 0.150** 0.114*** 0.141** 0.185** 0.077*** 0.050***
(1.99) (2.63) (2.40) (2.32) (4.53) (2.70)
Monetary Policy Credibility -0.037* -0.021 -0.044** -0.027
(1.73) (0.95) (2.04) (1.28)
Lagged Import price inflation 0.020 0.019 0.039**
(0.36) (1.47) (2.27)
Observations 545 440 440 545 545 545
Number of cross sections 22 21 21 22 22 22
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP
and HP filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Monetary
policy credibility is computed following the Laxton N'diaye (1997) formula. All estimations include country
dummies not reported. Estimations 3 and 6 include also time dummies. Instruments used are the lag 2 and 3 of
each of the explanatory variables apart from lagged CPI inflation. Absolute value of t statistics (robust to
heteroscedasticity) in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hausman test
always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. Sargan test always accepts the null of the validity of
instruments à the 10% level.








Estimations 1 2 Estimations 3
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV Dependent variable: Annual GDP deflator Inflation IV
Lagged CPI inflation 0.531*** 0.555*** Lagged GDP deflator inflation 0.715***
(4.22) (3.21) (4.83)
Output Gap 0.451** 0.319*** Output Gap 0.327***
(2.32) (5.17) (5.65)
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 0.071 0.041 Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 0.091
(0.51) (0.22) (0.46)
Import price inflation 0.122** 0.116* Import price inflation 0.115**
(2.22) (1.74) (1.73)
Monetary Policy Credibility -0.025
(1.02)
Observations 537 492 Observations 492
Number of cross sections 23 23 Number of cross sections 23
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Lagged GDP deflator inflation is GDP deflator inflation one year before. Output
Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of
imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports (goods and sevices) to GDP. Import price inflation * Imports to GDP is the product of
Import price inflation and Imports to GDP. All estimations include country dummies not reported. All estimations include a constant term.
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hausman test carried out for IV
estimations always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. Sargan test (not reported) always accepts the validity of instruments.









E s t i m a t i o n s 1234
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV
Lagged CPI inflation 0.635*** 0.624*** 0.778*** 0.734***
Output Gap 1.989*** 1.506*** 3.020*** 2.238***
Output Gap * IIT(20) -2.700*** -3.900***
Output Gap * IIT(70) -2.278*** -3.278***
Output Gap * Imports to GDP * IIT(20) 0.400
Output Gap * Imports to GDP * IIT(70) 0.522
Output Gap * Imports to GDP 0.346 0.378
Import price inflation  0.122*** 0.125*** 0.148*** 0.175***
Observations 450 471 450 471
Number of cross sections 22 22 22 22
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference
between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth
rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports (goods and
sevices) to GDP. Output gap * Imports to GDP is the product of the output gap and
Imports to GDP. Output gap * IIT * Imports to GDP is the product of output gap, the intra-
industry trade index and Imports to GDP. IIT(20) and IIT(70) is the Intra Industry Trade
index measured with the Grubel Loyd method. In estimations 1 and 3, IIT(20) is computed
with the STAN decomposition (20 industries). In estimations 2 and 4, IIT(70) is computed
with the CHELEM decomposition (70 industries). All estimations include country dummies
not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute value of t statistics in
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sargan test
(not reported) always accepts the validity of instruments at 10%.
Globalization represented by IIT and/or imports to GDP




E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Lagged CPI inflation 0.444*** 0.552*** 0.443*** 0.412*** 0.410*** 0.393*** 0.393***
Output Gap 0.329*** 0.426*** 0.325*** 0.336*** 0.337*** 0.297*** 0.298***
Import price inflation 0.053 -0.120* 0.050 0.045 0.019 -0.033
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 1.869*** 1.604*** 1.901*** 1.851*** 1.925*** 1.689*** 1.671***
Import price inflation * MPEN -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.016** -0.015*** -0.015***
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP* MPEN -0.017*** 0.002 -0.001
Commodity Import Price Inflation -0.019 -0.020
Import price inflation * log (GDP per Capita) 0.076 0.075**
Import price inflation * log (GDP) -0.020 -0.021**
Observations 386 386 386 380 380 386 386
Number of cross sections 20 20 20 19 19 20 20
Import price inflation pass-through to CPI inflation: the role of similarity between imports and 
domestic output.
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log
of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports
(goods and sevices) to GDP. MPEN is the Import Penetration ratio. Import price inflation*Imports to GDP is the product of
Import price inflation and Imports to GDP. Import price inflation*MPEN is the product of Import price inflation and Import
Penetration ratio. Import price inflation*log(GDP) is the product of Import price inflation and log of GDP. Import price
inflation*log(GDP per capita) is the product of Import price inflation and log of GDP per capita. All estimations include country
dummies not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hausman test (not reported) always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent.





E s t i m a t i o n s 123456789 1 0
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Lagged CPI inflation 0.549*** 0.504*** 0.486*** 0.505*** 0.518*** 0.453*** 0.507*** 0.453*** 0.480*** 0.477***
Output Gap 0.390*** 0.390*** 0.376*** 0.394*** 0.381*** 0.369*** 0.372*** 0.359*** 0.393*** 0.412**
Import price inflation 0.409*** 0.349** 0.480*** 0.430*** 0.027 0.025 0.403*** 0.343** 2.169*** 2.309***
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 0.222 0.266 1.395*** 1.360*** 0.217 0.295
Import price inflation * IIT(20) -0.602*** -0.652** -0.652** -0.445**
Import price inflation * IIT(70) -0.570** -0.643** -0.600** -0.236**
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP* IIT(20) 0.363 -1.728***
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP* IIT(70) 0.282 -1.802***
Commodity Import Price Inflation 0.024 0.020
Import price inflation * log (GDP per Capita) -0.068 -0.046
Import price inflation * log (GDP) -0.037* -0.052**
Observations 450 471 450 471 428 471 428 471 428 471
Number of cross sections 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Globalization represented by IIT and/or imports to GDP
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is
the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports (goods and sevices) to GDP. Import price inflation*Imports to GDP is
the product of Import price inflation and Imports to GDP. IIT is the Intra Industry Trade index measured with the Grubel Loyd method. IIT(20) is computedw i t ht h e
STAN decomposition (20 industries), IIT(70) is computed with the CHELEM decomposition (70 industries). Import price inflation*IIT is the product ofI m p o r tp r i c e
inflation and intra-industry trade index. Import price inflation*Imports to GDP*IIT is the product of Import price inflation, Imports to GDP and IIT.I m p o r tp r i c e
inflation*log(GDP per capita) is the product of Import price inflation and the log of GDP per capita. Import price inflation*log(GDP) is the product ofI m p o r tp r i c e
inflation and the log of GDP. All estimations include country dummies not reported. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sargan test (not reported) always accepts the validity of instruments at the 10% level.  




E s t i m a t i o n s 12345
Dependent variable: Annual GDP deflator Inflation IV IV IV IV IV
Lagged GDP deflator inflation 0.715*** 0.420* 0.710*** 0.757*** 0.786***
(3.99) (1.03) (4.83)
Output Gap 0.379*** 0.272*** 0.327*** 2.105*** 2.796***
(3.73) (7.03) (5.65)
Import price inflation 0.064 0.102** 0.112*** 0.105***
(1.14) (2.22)
Monetary Policy Credibility -0.037 0.115**
(0.75) (1.73)
Import price inflation * Imports to GDP 0.091
(0.46)
Output Gap * IIT -0.029*** -0.035***
Observations 548 440 492 450 471
Number of cross sections 22 21 23 22 22
GDP deflator inflation is GDP deflator year on year growth. Lagged GDP deflator inflation is GDP deflator
inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP. Import
price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports
(goods and sevices) to GDP. Import price inflation * Imports to GDP is the product of Import price inflation and
Imports to GDP. IIT is the Intra Industry Trade index measured with the Grubel Loyd method with the STAN
decomposition (20 industry-level). IIT_70 is computed with the Chelem decomposition (70 indutry-level). All
estimations include country dummies not reported. All estimations include a constant term. Absolute value of t
statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Hausman test carried
out for IV estimations always reject the null that OLS estimation is consistent. 









E s t i m a t i o n s 123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
Lagged CPI inflation 0.545*** 0.369*** 0.520*** 0.332*** 0.805*** 0.763*** 0.545*** 0.573*** 0.587*** 0.554*** 0.692*** 0.654*** 0.705*** 0.870***
Output Gap 0.990*** 0.997*** 0.716*** 0.761*** 3.403** 0.266** 0.132*** 1.019*** 1.111*** 1.366*** 0.569 1.056*** 0.750*** 2.752**
Output Gap * IIT -0.900* -1.010*** -0.676** -0.722** -0.041** -3.545** -0.014** -1.083*** -1.052*** -0.013** -0.015** -0.012** -0.793** -3.556**
Import price inflation  0.094*** 0.094** 0.098*** 0.101*** 0.148*** 0.094*** 0.064** 0.076* 0.077* 0.065** 0.237** 0.083*** 0.099** 0.141**
Output Gap * Monetary policy credibility -0.229 -0.014 -0.098 -0.096
Monetary policy credibility -0.028** -0.034***
Output Gap * Capital Flows -0.003 -0.003
Output Gap * Reservation Wage -0.005 -0.006
Output Gap * EPL -0.097* -0.090** -0.095** -0.102*
Output Gap * Low inflation environment 14.162*** 4.038 4.0351
Output Gap * Trade Balance -9.125
Observations 401 401 420 420 424 444 408 408 408 408 446 426 406 406
Number of cross sections 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 20 20 20 21 21 20 20
Impact of IIT on the sensitivity of Inflation to domestic Output Gap
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator o
Imports to GDP is the ratio of total imports (goods and sevices) to GDP. Import price inflation * Imports to GDP is the product of Import price inflation and Imports to GDP. IIT is the Intra Industry T
measured with the Grubel Loyd method (STAN industry decomposition). Monetary policy credibility is computed following the Laxton N'diaye method. Capital Flows is the ratio of gross private capit
GDP. Reservation wage is an index of unemployment insurance benefit generosity (source: Allard 2003). EPL is an index of employment protection legislation (source: Allard 2003). Low inflation envi
an moving average of past CPI inflation over the last three years. Trade balance is the ratio of net exports to GDP. All estimations include country dummies not reported. Absolute value of t s
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sargan test(not reported) always accepts the null at the 10% level that instruments are valid.  





E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567 8 9 1 0 1 1
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
country withdrawn AUS AUT BEL CAN CHE DNK ESP FIN FRA GBR GRC
Lagged CPI inflation 0.540** 0.612*** 0.630*** 0.626*** 0.617*** 0.600*** 0.632*** 0.638*** 0.621*** 0.585*** 0.564***
(2.515) (2.885) (2.885) (2.972) (2.880) (2.947) (2.950) (2.867) (2.883) (2.850) (2.827)
output gap 2.299*** 2.439** 2.485*** 2.454*** 2.415*** 2.368*** 2.499*** 2.489*** 2.470*** 2.465*** 2.292***
(3.449) (3.520) (3.520) (3.605) (3.523) (3.686) (3.607) (3.482) (3.543) (3.588) (3.743)
output gap * IIT -0.026*** -0.028** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.0297*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.026***
(-2.757) (-2.862) (-2.862) (-2.852) (-2.815) (-2.908) (-2.941) (-2.793) (-2.849) (-2.927) (-2.953)
import price inflation 0.233* 0.220* 0.210* 0.206* 0.217* 0.221** 0.213* 0.204* 0.212* 0.230** 0.232**
(1.883) (1.866) (1.866) (1.807) (1.884) (2.068) (1.795) (1.697) (1.890) (2.086) (2.230)
E s t i m a t i o n s 1 21 31 41 51 61 71 8 1 9 2 0 2 1 2 2
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
country withdrawn IRL ISL ITA JPN LUX NLD NOR NZL PRT SWE USA
Lagged CPI inflation 0.599*** 0.466*** 0.632*** 0.624*** 0.619*** 0.634*** 0.634*** 0.808*** 0.617*** 0.602*** 0.651***
(2.710) (4.066) (2.979) (3.087) (2.995) (2.867) (2.826) (3.126) (2.630) (2.948) (2.947)
output gap 2.415*** 0.938*** 2.461*** 2.681*** 2.429*** 2.514*** 2.463*** 2.960*** 2.711*** 2.366*** 2.451***
(3.432) (3.492) (3.650) (4.330) (3.686) (3.571) (3.531) (3.057) (3.530) (3.527) (3.446)
output gap * IIT -2.794*** -0.011** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.034*** -0.031*** -0.027*** -0.028***
(-0.028) (-2.493) (-2.934) (-3.446) (-2.958) (-2.840) (-2.811) (-2.593) (-2.833) (-2.779) (-2.756)
import price inflation 0.217* 0.121** 0.204* 0.264** 0.213* 0.203* 0.212* 0.130 0.182 0.227** 0.194
(1.876) (2.074) (1.819) (2.558) (1.947) (1.712) (1.820) (0.940) (1.407) (2.091) (1.608)
Withdrawing each countries of the sample
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is the
annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. IIT is Intra Industry Trade measured with the Grubel Loyd index. Output gap * IIT is the product of output gap and IIT. All
estimations include country dummies not reported. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** signi f i c a n ta t1 % .S a r g a nt e s t




Estimations 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV
estimation period 1984-2004 1985-2004 1986-2004 1987-2004 1988-2004 1989-2004
Lagged CPI inflation 0.619*** 0.308*** 0.797*** 0.624*** 0.643*** 0.484
(2.995) (2.776) (4.875) (4.868) (4.482) (4.744)
output gap 0.024*** 0.931*** 1.162*** 0.899*** 0.966*** 1.101***
(3.686) (3.239) (4.618) (4.756) (5.961) (4.722)
output gap * IIT -0.028*** -1.240** -1.090*** -0.881*** -0.963*** -1.095***
(-2.958) (-2.534) (-2.939) (-3.089) (-3.454) (-3.095)
import price inflation 0.213* -0.035 0.048 0.098 0.055 0.137*
(1.947) (-0.237) (0.531) (1.313) (0.482) (1.940)
Withdrawing the first years of the sample period
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and
HP filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. IIT is Intra Industry
Trade measured with the Grubel Loyd index. All estimations include country dummies not reported. Absolute value
of t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sargan test (not







E s t i m a t i o n s 1234567
Dependent variable: Annual CPI Inflation IV IV IV IV IV IV IV
estimation period 1984-2004 1984-2003 1984-2002 1984-2001 1984-2000 1984-1999 1984-1998
Lagged CPI inflation 0.619*** 0.597*** 0.620*** 0.615*** 0.628*** 0.600*** 0.616**
(2.995) (2.899) (2.851) (2.806) (2.688) (2.530) (2.540)
output gap 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.026***
(3.686) (3.666) (3.550) (3.667) (3.512) (3.361) (3.349)
output gap * IIT -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030***
(-2.958) (-2.951) (-2.847) (-3.015) (-2.862) (-2.724) (-2.663)
import price inflation 0.213* 0.222** 0.198* 0.196 0.192 0.213 0.206
(1.947) (2.021) (1.661) (1.585) (1.469) (1.642) (1.558)
Note: Lagged CPI inflation is annual CPI inflation one year before. Output Gap is the difference between log of GDP and HP
filter of log of GDP. Import price inflation is the annual growth rate of the deflator of imports. IIT is Intra Industry Trade measured
with the Grubel Loyd index. All estimations include country dummies not reported. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sargan test (not reported) always accepts the validity of
instruments.
Withdrawing the last years of the sample period
 
 